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The Porter hypothesis asserts polluting firms can benefit from environmental policies, 
arguing that well-designed environmental regulations stimulate innovation, which, by 
increasing either productivity or product value, leads to private benefits. As a 
consequence, environmental regulations would benefit both society and regulated firms. 
This point of view has found a receptive audience among policy makers and the popular 
press but has been severely criticized by economists.  In this paper, we present some of 
the arguments in this debate and review the empirical evidence available so far in the 
economic literature.  
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Since the early seventies, the scope of Environmental Regulations (ERs) in most 
developed economies has considerably broadened resulting in increased pollution control 
expenditures.  For example, in the US, pollution abatement investments increased by 
137% over the 1979-1994 period.  The estimated total annual abatement expenditure 
represents between 1.5% and 2.5% of the US GDP (see Berman and Bui, 2001).  The 
same trend has been observed in Canada where environmental protection expenditures by 
business increased by 27% from 1995 to 2002 (Statistics Canada, 1995 and 2002).  Given 
the growing concern for environmental quality and the threat of climate changes, 
significant increases in ERs and pollution control expenditures are very likely to continue 
in the near future.  Furthermore, ERs is especially relevant for the energy sector for it 
includes several “pollution intensive” industries such as petroleum or power generation.      
The traditional view among economists — ERs impose private costs on regulated 
industries — was recently challenged by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linden 
(1995).  In fact, what is now referred as the Porter Hypothesis (PH) states that stringent, 
well-designed ERs lead not only to social benefits but may very often also result in 
private benefits for regulated companies.  Much of the controversy in this debate has 
centered around the “very often” given the general consensus that there do indeed exist 
cases where ERs have improved polluting firms’ profit.  Critics of the PH argue that such 
success stories are not the norm and that overall, improving environmental quality is not 
a “free lunch”.  Obviously, the policy implications of this question are potentially huge.         
In Section II, we review the main arguments in this debate and present some of 
the theoretical foundations of the PH.  In section III, we assess the empirical evidence 
available thus far in the economic literature.  Since the controversy centered on whether 
there is systematic positive or negative relationship between ERs and regulated firms’ 
performance, we ignore case studies and focus on econometric analyses.  
  2II. Background 
 
Traditionally, economists believe that ERs have a negative impact on polluting firms.  
Several reasons justify this hypothesis, the most obvious being that ERs almost always 
require firms to allocate some input (labor, capital) to pollution reduction, which is 
unproductive from a business perspective. For example, new scrubbers installed in a 
power plant increase its capital stock but not its productive capacity.  In other words, ERs 
reduce firm productivity thereby increasing cost and lowering profit.
1   
  For Porter and van der Linden (1995), the traditional view has a narrow static 
perspective on firms’ reaction to ERs.  Indeed, faced with the prospect of higher 
abatement costs, firms will invest in innovation activities to find new ways to meet new 
regulatory requirements.  The resulting new production process or new product 
specifications would reduce pollution and at the same time lower production costs or 
increase product market value.
2  These benefits will very often offset and even exceed the 
costs initially imposed by regulations.  Clearly, the nature of the ERs here is critical.  
They should be stringent enough to trigger firms to overhaul their production process, but 
offer firms sufficient latitude regarding how to achieve the environmental targets.
3  

















Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Porter Hypothesis  
                                                 
1 Other reasons justifying a negative relationship between ERs and productivity include: i) emission control 
technology may reduce the production process efficiency; ii) ERs may reduce investments if they increase 
energy prices, an input that is complementary to capital; iii) investments in abatement capital may crowd 
out productive investments; iv) stricter ERs for new plants may delay introduction of new and more 
productive capital. 
2 Adopting strict ERs may also be a way for a country to become a leader in developing new, cleaner 
exportable technologies, as other countries adopt more stringent environmental norms.  
3 For example, technological standards do not provide any incentive to innovate.  On the contrary, 
economic instruments (such as emission charges or tradable permits) do provide flexibility and thereby 
incentives to innovate.   
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  Two main criticisms of the PH (see Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995) are as 
follows: first, this hypothesis rests on the idea that firms systematically ignore profitable 
opportunities.  In other words, why would regulation actually be needed for firms to 
adopt profit-increasing innovations?  In fact, Porter and van der Linden directly question 
the view that firms are profit-maximizing entities: "The possibility of regulation might 
act as a spur to innovation arises because the world does not fit the Panglossian belief that 
firms always make optimal choices."
4
  Second, even if there are systematically-profitable business opportunities that are 
missed (“low hanging fruit”), the next question is how could ERs change that reality? Are 
bureaucrats better informed about business conditions than managers?  Porter and van der 
Linden argue that ERs may help firms identify inefficient use of costly resources.  They 
may also produce and disseminate new information (e.g. best practice technologies) and 
help overcome organizational inertia. 
  A few research papers have set forth formal theoretical models underlining 
conditions under which the Porter result may emerge.
5  Kennedy (1994) examines the 
R&D investment decision of a risk-averse manager.  Since the outcome of the R&D 
program is uncertain, the manager will not choose an investment level that minimizes 
expected costs.  He will have a tendency to under-invest in R&D as he put more weight 
on bad outcomes than on good ones.  In this context, ERs may bring the manager’s 
decision closer to the optimal one by affecting the marginal value of an extra dollar spent 
on R&D.
6  Therefore, ERs would lead to a reduction in expected costs.  Note, however, 
that a number of specific conditions are required for this result to hold.   
  In a strategic trade model, Simpson and Bradford (1996) shows that a government 
may provide a strategic advantage to its domestic industry by imposing a strict ER.  The 
ER acts as a commitment device for the industry to invest aggressively in R&D activities 
that reduce marginal costs.  Once again, very specific conditions (in terms of parameters 
                                                 
4 Porter and van der Linden (1995), p.99. 
5 We restrict ourselves to theoretical works using the neo-classical approach.  For alternative views, see for 
example Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998) or Goldstein (2002).   
6 In Kennedy, ERs require that a portion α of the input x be used for abatement activities.  Since the 
marginal value of R&D activities depends on the level of input used for production (1-α)x, ERs affect the 
manager’s investment decision.     
  4and rival behavior) are necessary to obtain the Porter result.  Greaker (2003) also show 
that strict ERs may improve a domestic firm’s competitiveness in international markets if 
it transforms some of its variable costs into sunk expenditures.  Interestingly, he shows 
that the existence of economies of scale in abatement may lead to such an outcome. 
  Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) examine the impact of emission tax on the 
composition of capital using a vintage capital model.  They show that under some 
conditions, an emission tax leads to retirement of older vintage capital, thereby increasing 
average productivity.  However, the tax negatively impacts firms’ profit.  Furthermore, 
Feichtinger  et al. (2005) shows the opposite may also occur: an emission tax may 
increase the capital’s average age.      
Ambec and Barla (2002) develop a principal-agent model with renegotiation to 
formalize the idea that ERs may overcome organizational inertia.
7  In this model, a 
manager (agent) has private information about the outcome of an R&D investment. A 
successful R&D program means a new more productive and less polluting technology 
becomes available.  In order to favor revelation by the agent, the shareholder (i.e. the 
principal) must offer a compensation structure with a bonus (known as informational 
rent), when success is reported.  However, as this rent is a cost for the principal it lowers 
incentive to invest in R&D.  It can be shown that ERs reduce informational rent, thereby 
increasing R&D investment. 
Lastly, Morh (2001) shows that coordination failure may prevent introduction of 
cleaner and more productive technologies.  In their model, new technology productivity 
increases with the industry’s accumulated experience.  Therefore, this new technology 
may not be introduced because nobody wants to bear the initial learning cost. An ER 
forcing adoption may thus result in long-term private gains for the industry. 
Ambec and Barla (2005) provide a more detailed overview of the potential PH 
theoretical foundations.  The main conclusion of this review is that multiple interacting 
distortions are necessary to obtain the PH.  The ER must not only reduce pollution but 
must also affect another distortion in a way that improves regulated firms’ profit.  For 
example, ERs help increase market power or reduce firms’ agency costs.  In other words, 
                                                 
7 See also Campbell (2003) for a model where environmental regulations improve the principal’s position.  
  5the PH requires fairly specific conditions.  We now address the pertinent empirical 
evidence currently available.   
 
III. Empirical Evidence 
 
  While theoretical analyses underline conditions favoring the PH, its ultimate 
validity should be empirically evaluated.
8  Table 1 provides a basic summary of the 
empirical studies we considered for this review.  Rather than being exhaustive, we have 
tried to provide an overview of the various empirical strategies that help access the PH.  
Most of the selected researches have been published in peer-reviewed journals.   
Moreover, we have explicitly bias our choice toward pro-Porter results.
9
  The first strategy for accessing the PH is to test whether ERs affect innovation.  
Looking at a panel of US manufacturing industries for the 1973-1991 period, Jaffe and 
Palmer found that total R&D expenditure increased by 0.15% with pollution abatement 
cost increases of 1% (a proxy for environmental severity).  Interestingly, their results 
suggest a somewhat larger impact for the petroleum refining and extraction industry.  
They did not find any statistically significant link between the number of successful 
patent applications (a proxy for success of R&D activities) and ERs. However, 
Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) reports a positive but small relationship between ERs 
and the number of environmentally-related successful patent applications.
10   Research 
results thus far suggest a weak positive link between ERs and innovation, but the 
evidence is still inconclusive given the scarcity of studies conducted on this topic.  
  The impact of ERs on productivity is an avenue that has been more thoroughly 
explored by researchers, who began examining the issue even before the PH.  The list in 
Table 1 is a fairly representative sample of the results found in the literature: most studies 
report a negative relationship between ERs and productivity (or productivity growth).  
The impact may be quite important for some pollution-intensive industries.  For example, 
Gollop and Robert (1983) found that SO2 regulations slowed productivity growth of US 
                                                 
8 For an earlier review see Jaffe et al. (1995). 
9 We have also privileged studies on the energy sector.   
10 Landjouw and Mody (1996) and Popp (2004) also find some (non-econometrical) evidences of a positive 
link between patent application and environmental severity using international data.  
  6electric utilities by as much as 43% in the seventies.  Two studies provide some support 
of PH.  Berman and Bui (2001) reports that refineries located in the Los Angeles area, 
where stringent air pollution control regulations came into effect in the late eighties, 
enjoyed significantly-higher productivity than other US refineries, suggesting that 
pollution control investments also enhanced productivity.  Alpay, Buccola and Kerkvliet 
(2002) provides somewhat similar results for the Mexican food processing industry faced 
with increasing environmental regulations in the nineties.  Their empirical results show 
these increasing pressures were associated with productivity growth.  They estimate that 
a 10% increase in pollution regulation pressure resulted in an average 2.8% increase in 
productivity growth.  However, they do not find a similar pattern for the U.S. food 
industry. 
  We did not find any studies specifically examining how ERs per se may have 
resulted in increased product value.  However, the literature contains an increasing 
number of attempts to evaluate the premium consumers may be willing to pay for more 
environmentally-friendly products (see Table 1 for examples).  Green labels appear to 
have had some impact either through higher prices or market share.  However, further 
studies will be necessary to confirm the true economic potential of this relationship 
(especially studies using actual data rather than hypothetical choices from survey results).   
  Examining the impact on capital and investment, Nelson et al. (1993) finds that 
ERs increase the average capital age in US electric utilities, contrary to the modernization 
effect obtained from some theoretical models.  However, this result is likely to be driven 
by the fact that stricter regulations are imposed on new power plants.  For the US pulp 
and paper industry, Gray and Shabegian (1998) finds that State ERs significantly affect 
technological choices and somewhat reduce investment levels.  Moreover, a 1% 
abatement investment increase would crowd out productive investment by 1.88%.   
Therefore, these results more strongly support the traditional hypothesis.   
  Some studies have examined the impact of environmental regulation on firms’ 
financial performance.  For example, Brannlund et al. (1995) shows that ERs reduce the 
short-term profit of the Swedish pulp and paper industry, while King and Lennox (2001) 
found evidence of a positive relationship between ER proxies and Tobin’s Q using data 
from the US manufacturing sector.  However, this latter result is weak and unstable.  For 
  7US electric utilities, Filbeck and Gorman (2004) finds that ERs negatively impact 
financial returns. A growing empirical literature examines the relationships between 
firms’ environmental and financial performance.  They usually show that bad (good) 
unexpected news about a firm’s environmental performance result in significant negative 
(positive) abnormal returns.  If, as expected, environmental performance is positively 
affected by ERs, this would imply a positive impact of ERs on return.  However, this 
conclusion may be misleading for several reasons.  First, higher environmental 
performance may be a signal for investors of good management thereby creating an 
“artificial” correlation between returns and environmental results.  Second, it may also 
signal lower than expected abatement costs.  In contrast, poor environmental results are 
bad news for investors as they anticipate increased future liability costs and intensifying 
regulator scrutiny.  
  Lastly, the literature on the impact of ERs on firm location decision and cross-
countries trade patterns may also be useful in accessing the PH.  In fact, usually tested in 
the literature is the “pollution haven hypothesis,” which states that strict ERs are likely to 
hurt the competitiveness of domestic polluting firms, thereby reducing their market share 
or even driving them to move to countries with less stringent regulations.  Obviously, if 
the PH holds, one should observe no trade diversion effect and even a trade stimulating 
effect of ERs.  Rather than reviewing this literature in detail, we can directly refer to 
Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for an up-to-date overview of this literature.  Their 
main conclusion is the following: “The early literature based on cross-sectional analysis 
typically tended to find that environmental regulations did not significantly affect firms’ 
location decisions.  However, several recent studies using panel data to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, or instruments to control for endogeneity, do find statistically-
significant pollution haven effects of reasonable magnitude”.                    
  8 
IV. Conclusions 
 
From this review the following conclusions can be drawn: 
•  There is only scanty, weak evidence to date showing that ERs stimulate 
innovation activity.  More research is necessary to provide conclusive results 
regarding that relationship. 
•  Most evidence points towards ERs as having a negative impact on productivity 
growth.  For pollution-intensive industries, this impact could be significant.   
•  There is mounting evidence that a price premium exists for more 
environmentally-friendly products. 
•  The scarce evidence available suggests that ERs may have a significant negative 
impact on investments and increase the average age of capital.  
•  There is mixed evidence on the relationship between financial and environmental 
performance.  Several studies find that investors react positively to unexpected 
good environmental performance.  However, it is not clear whether this result 
actually supports the PH.  Studies directly examining the impact of ERs on firms’ 
financial performance have generated more contradictory results. 
•  Recent studies suggest that ERs may have an impact on businesses’ localization. 
 
Overall, it appears that to date, more evidence has been reported against, than in favor of, 
PH.  However, it would be unreasonable, at this stage, to simply reject this hypothesis.  
Indeed, the existing empirical research efforts are tainted with several weaknesses.  First, 
most studies examine the impact of traditional command and control regulations, while 
theoretical research findings suggest that innovation activities (thus offsets) are more 
likely to result from incentive-based regulations.  As recourse to economic instruments is 
expanding, future research may be able to properly address the PH.  Second, more 
progress is required towards accessing regulation stringency.  Indeed, the proxies now 
used in the literature are usually crude and possibly misleading.  For example, high 
pollution-control expenditures may not only result from ER severity, but also from poor 
management practices.  A negative relationship between a firm’s financial performance 
  9  10
                                                
and its abatement expenditures may therefore simply reflect that inefficient firms have 
both higher pollution-control costs and weak financial results.  A third, problem is related 
to the indicators used to access a firm’s performance.  For example, studies examining 
the impact of ERs on productivity usually use productivity indicators that underestimate 
the productivity growth rate of firms that reduce emissions (see Kolstad, 2000).  Indeed, 
these traditional measures take into account the negative effect on productivity of 
reducing pollution (increased use of pollution control inputs) but completely ignore the 
reduction of “bad outputs” that may be valuable for the firm.
11  Fourth, while the PH is in 
essence a dynamic hypothesis, most empirical research use empirical specification with a 
very simple dynamic structure or none at all.  In a working paper, Lanoie et al. (2001) 
shows that allowing richer dynamic effects may drastically change the relationship 
between pollution control expenditure and productivity growth in the Quebec 
manufacturing sector.  Lastly, future empirical research should take into account recent 
theoretical contributions showing that the Porter results require interactions of several 
distortions.  This could help to more accurately pinpoint where to look for Porter effects.  
 
11 For a firm, reducing emissions will be valuable if these “undesirable outputs” have negative shadow 
prices. Table 1. Empirical studies relevant for accessing the Porter Hypothesis. 
Study  Data   Methodology  Main Results 
I. Impact of ERs on Innovation 
Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997) 
▪ Panel of U.S. manufacturing 
industries – 1973-1991. 
▪ Innovation proxy: R&D investments and number of 
successful patent applications. 
▪ ERs proxy: Pollution control capital costs. 
▪ Reduced form model with industry-fixed effects. 
 
▪ R&D significantly increases with ERs.  
Elasticity: +0.15. 




▪ Panel of 146 U.S. 
manufacturing industries 1983-
1992. 
▪ Innovation proxy: number of environmentally-
related successful patent applications. 
▪ ERs: Pollution control operating costs and number 
of air and water pollution control inspections. 
▪ Reduced form model with industry fixed effects. 
 
▪ Small but significant impact of pollution 
operating cost on number of patents. 
▪ No impact of inspections. 
II. Impact of ERs on Productivity 
▪ ERs reduce productivity growth by 43%.  Gollop and Robert 
(1983) 
▪ 56 U.S. electric utilities, 
1973-1979. 
 
▪ Productivity measure: derived from the estimation 
of a cost function that includes the ERs proxy. 
▪ ERs: the intensity of SO2 regulations based on 
actual emissions, state standard and the utility 
estimated unconstrained emission levels.  
 
Smith and Sims 
(1983) 
▪ 4 Canadian beer breweries, 
1971-1980. 
▪ Productivity measure: derived from the estimation 
of a cost function. 
▪ Two breweries were submitted to an effluent 
surcharge and two breweries were not.  
 
▪ Average productivity growth regulated 
breweries -0.08% compared to +1.6% for the 
unregulated plants. 
 
      (continued)
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Study Data    Methodology  Results 
Gray (1987)  ▪ 450 U.S. manufacturing 
industries, 1958-1978. 
 
▪ Total factor productivity index regresses on 
pollution control operating costs. 
▪ 30% of the decline in productivity growth in 
the seventies due to ERs. 
Barbera and Mc 
Connel (1990) 
▪ 5 U.S. pollution intensive 





▪ Derive the direct (abatement cost growth) and 
indirect (changes in other inputs and production 
process) effects of pollution control capital using a 
cost function approach. 
▪ Overall, abatement capital requirements reduce 
productivity growth by 10% to 30%. 
▪ Indirect effect sometimes positive. 
Dufour, Lanoie and 
Patry (1998) 
▪ 19 Quebec manufacturing 
industries, 1985-1988. 
▪ Total factor productivity growth regressed on 
changes in the ratio of the value of investment in 
pollution-control equipment  to the total cost. 
 
▪ ERs have a significantly negative impact on 
productivity growth rate. 
Berman and Bui 
(2001) 
▪ US petroleum refining 
industry, 1987-1995. 
▪ Comparison of total factor productivity of California 
South Coast refineries (submitted to stricter air 
pollution regulations) with other US refineries.  
  
▪ Stricter regulations imply higher abatement 
costs.  However, these investments appear to 
increase productivity.  
Alpay, Buccola and 
Kerkvliet (2002) 
▪ Mexican and U.S. processed 
food sectors (1962-1994)  
▪ Productivity measure obtained through the 
estimation of a profit function that includes pollution 
abatement expenditures (US) and inspection 
frequency (Mexico).  
 
▪ US: negligible effect of ERs on both profit and 
productivity. 
 ▪ Mexico: ERs have a negative impact on profits 
but a positive impact on productivity. 
        (continued)
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Study Data    Methodology  Results 
Gray and Shadbegian 
(2003) 
▪ 116 U.S. paper mills, 1979-
1990. 
▪ Regression of total factor productivity on pollution 
abatement operating costs. 
▪ Estimation of a production function that includes 
pollution abatement costs. 
 
▪ Significant reduction in productivity associated 
with abatement efforts particularly in integrated 
paper mills. 
III. Price premiums for environmentally-friendly products 
Roe et al. (2001)  ▪ Survey (joint analysis) 835 
respondents. 
▪ Cross-section of 21 green 
electricity products and 
attributes (2000) 
 
▪ Analysis of price premium for green label 
electricity as dependant upon demographic 
characteristics and product attributes.  
▪ Small premium for tangible improvements in 
air emissions even without altering fuel mix. 
▪ Significantly larger premium if reliance upon 
renewable fuels increases. 
▪ Significant impact of eco-label.  
Teils, Roe and Hicks 
(2002) 
▪ 66 months of post-label time 
series obtained from scanner 
data in 3000 US supermarkets 
 
▪ Impact of dolphin-safe labels on consumer 
purchases of tuna.  Estimation of a demand system for 
canned protein market. 
▪ Small positive impact of the label on market 
share. 
Bjorner et al. (2004)  ▪ Panel data for 1,596 Danish 
households from 1997 to 2001. 
▪ Impact of Scandinavian environmental label (Nordic 
Swan) on consumer choices for toilet paper, paper 
towels and detergent brands. Estimation of a mixed 
logit model of brand selection. 
▪ Statistically-significant price premium for 
labeled toilet paper: 13% to 18%. 
▪ Premium for detergent: 17 to 29%.  Small 
premium for paper towels (less statistically-
significant results). 
 
       (continued)
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Study Data    Methodology  Results 
IV. Impact of ERs on Investments 
Nelson et al. (1993)  ▪ 44 U.S. electric utilities over 
the 1969-1983 period. 
▪ Three-equation model: i) age of capital; ii) 
emissions; and iii) regulatory expenditures. 
▪ Model includes two ER proxies: air pollution cost 
and total pollution control costs per KW capacity. 
▪ ERs significantly increase age of capital 
(elasticity: +0.15). 
▪ Age of capital has no statistically-significant 
impact on emissions. 
▪ Regulation has impacted emission levels. 
 
Gray and Shadbegian 
(1998) 
▪ Panel of 116 U.S. paper mills 
(1972-1990). 
▪ Multinomial logit for technological choice (Kraft, 
sulfite, mechanical, etc.), and investment level 
equation. 
▪ ER proxies: i) pro environmental votes by State 
congressional delegation; and ii) index of air and 
water regulation severity. 
 
▪ Technological choice significantly affected by 
ERs. 
▪ Negative impact of ERs on investment level 
(marginally significant). 
▪ Productive investment is significantly reduced 
by abatement investments (-188%). 
V. Impact of ERs on Firms’ Financial Performance 
Brannlund et al. 
(1995) 
▪ 41 Swedish pulp and paper 
mills – 1989-1990.  
▪ Estimation of regulated and unregulated profit using 
a non-parametric model of the technology. 
 
 
▪ Average reduction in profits due to regulation -
between 4% and 17%.  However, between 66% 
and 88% of mills are unaffected by regulation. 
      (continued)
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Study Data    Methodology  Results 
Khanna et al. (1998)  ▪ 91 U.S. Chemical firms over 
1989-1994 period  
▪ Event study: test for abnormal returns following 
annual disclosure of toxic release inventory. 
▪ Panel regression model to identify determinants of 
abnormal returns.  Particularly on-site/off-site releases 
and firm ranking within industry. 
▪ Test impact of negative abnormal returns on future 
on-site/off-site and total releases.  
 
 
▪ Negative abnormal returns during one-day 
period following disclosure. 
▪ Abnormal losses are higher for firms that do 
not reduce emissions or whose performance 
worsens compared to other firms. 
▪ Abnormal losses push firms to increase wastes 
transferred off-site.   
Dasgupta and 
Laplante  (2001) 
▪ 126 events involving 48 
publicly-traded firms in 
Argentina, Chile, the 
Philippines and Mexico  
▪ Event study: test for abnormal returns following 
positive (investment in pollution control, awards) or 
negative (complaints, spills) environmental news. 
 
▪ 20 out of 39 positive events lead to positive 
abnormal returns (+20% in firm value over a 11 
days window) 
▪ 33 of 85 negative events lead to negative 
abnormal returns. 
 
King and Lenox 
(2001) 
▪ Panel of 652 U.S. 
manufacturing firms (1987-
1996).  Firms must be included 
in the EPA’s Toxic Release 
Inventory. 
▪ Tobin’s Q regressed on control variables, firms’ 
environmental performance and proxy for ERs. 
▪ ERs: number of environmental permits required and 
average pollution per capita in polluting industries in 
State of firm’s operations. 
▪ Positive impact of ERs on financial 
performance but only significant in one 
specification. 
▪ Positive link between financial and 
environmental performance.  
  
Filbeck and Gorman 
(2004) 
▪ 24 U.S. electrical utilities 
1996-1998. 
▪ Impact of environmental regulation compliance 
index on financial returns 
▪ Negative relationship between returns and 
environmental regulation compliance. 
 
      (continued)
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Study Data    Methodology  Results 
Gupta and Goldar  
(2005) 
▪ 17 Indian pulp and paper 
plants, 15 auto firms and 18 
chlor alkali firms (1999-2001). 
▪ Event study: test for abnormal returns following 
public release of a Green Rating by an NGO. 
▪ Green rating based on best practice. 
 
▪ Negative relationship between abnormal 
returns and environmental rating. 
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